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How does personal politics and identity influence media framing?
Assessing religion, political engagement and party affiliation as
moderating influences on framing effects.

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I confirm that this dissertation is entirely my own work.

Abstract

One of the key processes through which media effects can occur is media framing. Many studies in the past have explored the effects of media framing on audiences, showing that frames can be very effective at influencing the attitudes of those exposed to the frame. Furthermore, there have been numerous studies that examine the factors which may influence the effectiveness of news frames. These can come from the frames themselves – such as the credibility of the news source or the framing techniques used – or at audience level. This study is primarily interested in three audience-level factors that might influence framing effects, that of political engagement, political affiliation and religious identity. With these three variables being tested, this study aims to answer the question as to the effect of personal identity and personal politics on media framing.

Using the issue of antisemitism in the Labour Party, an issue that combines religion and party politics, this study aims to test the attitudes of participants when exposed to two different news frames, with political engagement, political affiliation and religion acting as layered independent variables. To do this, an experimental research design using an A/B random assignment test will be used to survey respondents and collect statistical data fit for analysis. This study will go on to prove that political engagement, political affiliation and religion act as moderating influences on the strength of framing effects.

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Introduction

When discussing the topic of media influence one of the key concepts likely to be discussed, both inside and outside academia, is framing. Many studies in the past have shown that the framing of news stories, used to promote certain aspects, attitudes or ideologies related to the story, can have a large effect on the audience (Nelson et al, 1997; Chong & Druckman, 2007). However, the ability of a media frame to produce effects can depend on many factors, such as the credibility of the news source (Druckman, 2001) or the effectiveness of the framing techniques used (Entman, 1993). More importantly, the ability of a frame to be effective depends on the individual consuming the news source. This study intends to explore the possibility of certain individual characteristics, in particular personal identity and personal politics, acting as moderating influences that impact the effectiveness of frames. To test the possibility of 'personal politics' influencing framing effects, this study intends to examine the influence of political engagement and political party affiliation on the ability of a media frame to be effective. Furthermore, whilst someone's 'personal identity' can include a number of aspects such as gender, ethnicity and sexuality, this study intends to be the first to test religion in regard to moderating framing effects. This study is therefore significant, as it will fill a gap in current communications literature regarding moderating influences on framing.

To find answers to these questions, this study adopts an experimental research design, using an A/B random assignment test. This experiment relies on surveying 100 participants, who will be asked to read a short news article before answering a questionnaire.[1] Following the blueprint of Nelson et al's (1997) framing project, this study relies on two articles discussing the same news story from two different perspectives. The participants will be exposed to one of the two frames before answering the questionnaire. The questionnaire will capture their attitudes towards the story (as well as relevant personal information). The intention is to then examine the framing effects by running statistical analyses involving the attitudes, the frames, and the other relevant variables which in this case will be political engagement, political affiliation, and religious identity.

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[1] See P.61-67

For these results to have meaning however, the news story used in the frame has to be one which is both party political and related to religious affairs. Therefore, this study incorporates a long-running political issue in the UK for its frames, that of antisemitism in the Labour Party. In particular, a more recent story in the saga was used, that of the Labour Party deciding not to adopt the full International Holocaust Remembrance Alliances (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism. This whole issue is naturally highly controversial, making it a somewhat risky choice of topic, however this is something of a valuable characteristic in itself, as it will perhaps make the findings of this study all the more illuminating. Furthermore, this is an issue with a number of vastly contrasting viewpoints, especially regarding the antisemitism definition (Silverstein, 2018; Carrell, 2018). Therefore, two frames have been constructed offering opposing viewpoints on this story. Frame 1 is sympathetic to Labour's actions regarding the definition and downplays the antisemitism scandal somewhat,[2] whilst Frame 2 is highly critical of the Labour Party and its leadership, highlighting the most damning aspects of their track record.[3]

To answer the research question and achieve this study's overall aim, which is to discover the extent to which identity and personal politics moderates framing effects, four working hypotheses have been constructed. The first hypotheses states that participants exposed to Frame 1 are less likely to have a negative opinion about the Labour Party and its actions than those exposed to Frame 2. The purpose of this hypothesis is to establish that framing effects have occurred so that solid conclusions based on the next three hypotheses can later be made. The second hypothesis states that participants with high levels of political engagement are less likely to be influenced by the frames, which would prove that political engagement acts as a moderating variable. The third hypothesis states that those with political affiliations to the Labour Party and Conservative Party are less likely to be influenced by the frames than those with no affiliation, which would prove the ability of political affiliation to act as a moderating variable. The fourth hypothesis asserts that participants who identify as Jewish are less likely to be influenced by the frames than those who do not identify as Jewish, which would show that

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[2] See P.59
[3] See P.60

religious identity acts as a moderating variable. If hypotheses 2 to 4 are proven to be correct, then the research question will have been satisfactorily resolved.

This study is split into four main chapters. The first chapter outlines and critiques the current academic discussion around media and framing effects. This is important not only because it provides a detailed contextual background of the theory behind this experiment but allows the results of this study to be explained by existing framing theory. The second chapter describes to methodology used in this study, detailing why certain decisions were made in order to capture the richest data possible, whilst also highlighting some of the methodological constraints of this study. The third chapter presents the results in the form of statistical tables framed by the four working hypotheses. The fourth chapter discusses and analyses the results in further detail, connecting it to the theories outlined in the first chapter, as well as highlighting how the results affect the current understanding of framing in the academic field. The study will end with a short conclusion, declaring that three of the four hypotheses were adequately proved (with the other only being revised to a slight extent), and naming a number of studies for further enquiry.

1. Theory

The following section is a theoretical discussion that outlines and analyses the various concepts being explored and tested in this study. Furthermore, the strength of arguments and theories put forth by communications scholars will be assessed. It is important that the state of the conversation around media effects and framing effects is outlined to provide critical context to the eventual findings. Furthermore, it is also vital that findings made in similar studies are highlighted in order to explain how said authors came to those conclusions.

This literature review is therefore split into two parts. The first section outlines and evaluates the academic discussion around media effects and how it has shifted between a general belief in weak effects and strong effects. The purpose of this is to assess where the findings of this study, the most general conclusion of which is that the media can have strong effects, fits into the broader academic field of communications. The second section delves into research around framing effects in particular. The section defines the concept of framing and explains how the process of framing works according to other scholars, as well as critiquing the existing literature regarding individual-level moderators, highlighting a potential gap in the literature regarding the concept of 'identity'.

1.1. Media Effects

This study is not only an addition to the many experiments that explore the concept of media framing, but is also a minute addition to the vast ocean of literature that explores media effects in general. The conversation around the strength of media effects is characterized by a historical debate between those who believe there are strong media effects and those who believe there are only limited media effects. However, there is also said to be a distinction between the conventional wisdom held by the public that the media is incredibly powerful (McQuail, 2005) and the academic consensus that remains vague and inconclusive regarding the strength of media effects. Whilst it is undeniable that the media does influence everyday lives, for instance a weather report changing a person's plans for the day (ibid.), it is the idea of general aggregate trends involving changes in people's behaviour and/or beliefs that academics have found little evidence for. However, this was not always the case, as the consensus in

communication studies has followed a historical pattern that switches between a belief in strong effects and weak effects (Schwartz, 2015; Lazarsfeld et al, 1948).

1972 saw the publication of one of the most influential works in the field of media effects by McCombs & Shaw (1972) which outlined the theory of 'agenda-setting'. The concept of 'agenda-setting' is not only considered a normative function of the press in democratic countries (Sen, 1981; Norris & Odugbemi, 2009), but is also one of the ways that the media can have an effect on the audience. The idea behind this is that the media can choose which issues are given the most coverage in the news cycle, thus bringing them to the forefront of people's attention (McCombs & Reynolds, 2009). One of the other ways that the media can influence media consumers is through 'priming'. Priming works whereby the media shape people's 'related thoughts' on certain issues. In other words, the media sets the benchmarks by which people judge certain issues by relating something being covered in the news to something that already exists in your head (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987), whether that be a fact or belief. Agenda-setting and priming are closely linked, as explained by Scheufele & Tewksbury (2007), who say that "by making certain topics more salient… mass media can also shape the considerations people take into account when making (political) judgements" (p11). There is plenty of empirical evidence to back up these two theories, and they make sense logically, however these media effects are considered 'cognitive effects' whereas this study is primarily interested in persuasion effects, which better defines media framing. Nevertheless, these processes are still important to define as they have direct links to the process of framing.

On the other hand, 'cognitive effects' have been called "second order" (Zaller, 1996, p17) effects when compared to 'persuasion effects'. These types of effects are what people who believe in powerful media tend to be concerned with (McQuail, 2005). Scholars suggest that cognitive effects like agenda-setting and priming affect what people think about and how they think about it (Iyangar, 1991; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987), which if taken as a given, means that persuasion effects must be telling people what to think about certain issues, being less subtle than cognitive effects. However, if this logic is followed it suggests that persuasion effects are easier to detect, when in reality the

opposite is true. There are at least three broad reasons why media persuasion effects are so difficult for communication scholars to find.

1.1.1. The difficulty in finding strong persuasion effects

The modern media landscape is one of the reasons that strong aggregate media effects have been so hard to find. This new "sociotechnological context of political communication" (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008, p707) is defined by the 'individualisation' of people's media experiences. This process is a direct result of the proliferation of media channels, giving media consumers more choice (ibid.). This new context means that old research paradigms are no longer effective at picking up on strong effects (Livingstone, 1996). If people now consume media which fits with their individual preferences, it follows that those people are less likely to show changes in attitudes when exposed to media which challenges those views. In fact, what is more likely is that it will only reinforce their original view. This is known as 'reinforcement theory' which is still considered a persuasion effect even if the media in question is not specifically persuading the consumer to have a different view. However, this theory is considered impossible to measure using existing experimental methods because they require observable changes in attitudes (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008).

Therefore, whilst it's clear that 'reinforcement' is an effect common in the modern media, it seems that methodological constraints make it near impossible for the theory to be proved. For this reason, it has been said that the academic discussion on media effects "is more about epistemological limitations of social science research than the media" (Livingstone, 1996, p306), explaining why the debate remains inconclusive. These limitations are logical and well-established, such as the fact that large aggregate effects can only occur over a very large amount of time, making snapshots of aggregate trends near impossible (ibid.). Furthermore, there is no experimental framework through which reinforcement effects can be properly tested (ibid.). However, there has been some dissent towards the idea that strong persuasion effects cannot be located and found, firstly from studies regarding presidential elections which have shown large swings in voter attitudes in relation to media coverage (Zaller, 1996), as well as more classical tests regarding violent programming and viewers' subsequent tendencies towards violence (Friedrich & Stein, 1973).

Another reason why it has been difficult for academics to find strong effects is perhaps because their conclusions are weak relative to the thirst for proof that strong media effects exist. This point has been raised by Dennis McQuail (2005) who has noted "widespread belief that mass media is a powerful instrument of influence on opinion and of effects on behaviour" (p456), whilst Sonia Livingstone (1996) has pointed to "a moral panic" (p313). The idea here is that media power is overemphasized outside of academic circles to such an extent, that the "bland, cautious conclusions which researchers offer" (Livingstone, 1996, p313) are unsatisfactory in comparison. Furthermore, there is a fear amongst academics that research into media effects is driven by political interests that want to blame their failures on the power of the media over the public (ibid.). This has subsequently led to academics demanding an incredibly high standard of proof for strong media effects.

The reason the general debate around media effects is important to this study is because it explains why empirical evidence of strong media effects will not in itself prove that the media has a large amount of sway over people. However, this study is a framing experiment first and foremost, and whilst the debate around media effects is relevant, the literature regarding media framing is perhaps more informative regarding what this study is trying to achieve.

1.2. Framing Theory

The following subchapter delves into the theory surrounding the process of framing and its effects, as well as identifying similar studies to this one. It does this first by defining and explaining media framing in general, especially the distinctions between different types of frames and the complicated process by which a news frame is consumed and interpreted by the audience. Secondly, previous framing experiments will be analysed to both illustrate framing effects in action and explain why these experiments tend to produce strong media effects (bucking the trend outlined in the previous subchapter). Thirdly, there will be a discussion around individual-level moderators and how they tend to influence framing effects, highlighting the vagueness by which 'identity' is discussed as a moderator.

As a term in communications research, framing can be separated into two distinct concepts. The first, the 'media frame', refers to a "process by which a communication source constructs and defines a social or political issue" (Nelson et al, 1997, p567). In other words, journalists can "choose images and words that have the power to influence how audiences interpret and evaluate issues and policies" (Scheufele & Tewkesbury, 2009). The explanation most commonly referred to by communication scholars is from Robert Entman (1993) who highlights the framing methods of "selection and salience" (p52). This involves selecting certain images and words and making them more salient so that the audience is more likely to pay attention to them. The news articles used in this study are a good example of this technique, using images as a framing tool (Reese, 2001). Frame 1 selects an image of the Jewish Labour Movement with the intention of conveying a sense of a good relationship between Labour and the Jewish community.[4] On the other hand, Frame 2 selects an image of a dishevelled Jeremy Corbyn, with the intention of making him look uncomfortable and ultimately, guilty.[5] Also mentioned by Entman (1993) is the importance of "presence and absence" (p54), and particularly the power of 'absence', or in other words, excluding certain information (Sniderman et al, 1991). For instance, Frame 1 excludes specific examples of high-profile antisemitism scandals involving key figures in the Labour Party, something which can be seen in Frame 2.

The other concept framing can refer to is that of the 'individual frame'. An individual frame refers to the process within one's own head for dissecting information and arriving to conclusions, particularly regarding how that information affects what they already know (Scheufele & Tewkesbury, 2007; Entman, 1993). Chong & Druckman's (2007) individual frame definition is "what an audience member believes to be the most salient aspect of an issue" (p101), which is obviously quite simplistic, even if it is a good way of comparing it to Entman's (1993) 'selection and salience' definition of a media frame. Whilst these two concepts are separate, they are also incredibly closely linked. Indeed, the entire purpose of a media frame is to influence or invoke the individual frame. This study uses

[4] See P. 59
[5] See P. 60

media frames and is partly testing the strength of the effect caused by media frames (although this has been done many times in the past).

There are some interesting explanations as to how the different types of frames are employed in the overall framing process, particularly Robert Entman's (1993) four frame 'locations', and Dietram Scheufele's (1999) four framing 'processes'. Entman (1993) contends that frames exist in four locations: the communicator, the text, the receiver, and the culture. The 'text' is an example of a media frame, with 'text' being interchangeable with 'image' or whatever media tool is being used to convey a message. The frames used in the locations of the 'communicator' and 'receiver' are examples of individual frames. As Entman explains, "*communicators* make conscious or unconscious framing judgements when deciding what to say, guided by frames…that organize their belief system" (p52). It then follows that the 'receiver' is using the same individual frame organizing their 'belief system' when consuming a media piece. The location of frames in 'culture' is perhaps a more abstract concept, although Entman's explanation of "a set of commonly invoked frames" (p52) makes it sound quite simple. However, in the context of media and individual frames it can perhaps be seen as a collection of individual frames forming common frames that subsequently affect individual frames, creating something of a loop. In a work perhaps more concerned with the process of priming than framing, Erving Goffman (1974) alludes to "socially shared category systems" (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2009, p18), suggesting that frames can become widespread, and thus used subconsciously in others' individual frames.

However, Scheufele's (1999) four framing processes definition is perhaps better at explaining the overall framing process and where the media and individual frames fit within them. These processes – 'frame-building', 'frame-setting', 'individual-level effects' and 'journalists as audiences' – constitute something of a "feedback loop" (103). *Frame-building* is essentially the origin of the media frame contained in a certain media source. It is easier to imagine these as the raw materials out of which a structure (frame) is made. Scheufele notes that there are many things that can influence this process, such as the journalists' individual frame, the political orientation of the news medium, as well as external sources such as political actors or interest groups (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). *Frame-setting*

is the actual act of framing in the sense of 'selection and salience' (Scheufele, 1999; Entman, 1993). Scheufele (1999) notes that this process is almost identical to the 'agenda-setting' process as it was laid out by McCombs & Shaw (1972), with McCombs subsequently describing the process of frame-setting as 'second-level agenda-setting' (McCombs et al, 1997). A better way of visualizing the similarity and difference between the two is that agenda-setting involves "issue salience", whilst frame-setting is "issue attribute salience" (Scheufele, 1999, p116), in other words the finer details within an issue. Scheufele has noted some uncertainty over whether the source of frame-setting comes from the producer of the medium or its audience, referencing the work of Nelson et al (1997) who insist that 'perceived importance' is a larger factor that simply 'salience'. Scheufele (1999) is reluctant to claim it as one or the other, although it seems like there is no reason it cannot be both, unless 'frame-setting' needs to be split into two separate categories to capture both processes.

Following the frame-setting stage, the *individual-level effects* are the effects that the media source has on the individual frame and is indeed one of the aspects being tested in this framing experiment (Scheufele, 1999). Lastly, the *journalists as audiences* stage refers to the effect that the audience's response to the media source has on the journalist's individual frame. Thus, a 'feedback-loop' is created since said journalist's individual frame is then a key part of the 'frame-building' process for the next piece (ibid.). This remains the most enriching explanation of the framing process, especially if the 'perceived importance' point at the frame-setting stage is implemented. This is because it is the only place where the process of the audience's individual frame affecting the consumption of the source is mentioned, something which this study will show is a vital process in determining how strong a media frame is.

1.2.1. Previous Framing Experiments

Despite the suggestion made in the previous subchapter regarding the difficulty scholars have in finding empirical evidence for strong media effects (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008; Livingstone 1996), many framing experiments actually do find evidence of strong effects (Chong & Druckman, 2007).[6]

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[6]Other framing experiments that have shown strong effects include Nelson & Oxley (1999), Tewksbury et al (2000), Shen (2004), Shen & Edwards (2005), Brewer (2002), Boyle et al (2006).

The best example of this is Nelson et al's (1997) project named 'Media framing of a civil liberties conflict and its effect on framing', the methodology of which serves as a blueprint for this study. Their experiment used a news story involving a Ku Klux Klan rally, with two news articles containing frames emphasizing competing values (ibid.). One of the articles emphasized freedom of speech for the KKK rally, and the other frame emphasized the importance of public order by focusing on the disturbances caused by the rally. The results of the study showed that the frames did indeed evoke the desired value on aggregate, showing the frames to be effective (ibid.). However, the one study which looked (indirectly) at the ability of identity to influence framing effects, was done by Terkildsen & Schnell (1997). This study used conflicting news articles to frame women's rights issues, using a competing values frame of economic equality and political equality. The economic frame was shown to lower support for feminist values amongst male participants, whilst no effect on attitudes was found in female participants. This study shows that identity (in this case gender) can be a moderating factor in the ability of frames to produce effects, perhaps because of the Lecheler et al (2009) 'issue importance' theory. The next subsection will explain the relevance of these experiments and how the individual frame works to produce effects.

1.2.2. Individual frames and moderating factors

Scholars concerned with framing are keen to note that there are a number of issues and factors which might influence the strength of framing effects. Whilst some of these might stem from the communicator, for instance the credibility of the source may act as a moderating effect (Druckman, 2001), the majority of these come from the individual frame. Chong & Druckman's (2007) 'individual considerations', where they detail the characteristics of people's thoughts (or 'considerations') when consuming a media source, is perhaps the best way of illustrating how an individual frame influences how the audience consumes a news source.

Chong & Druckman (ibid.) refer to these characteristics as availability, accessibility, and applicability. *Availability* simply refers to how a thought must exist in an individual's memory for it to be called upon when dissecting new information (ibid.). For instance, a participant in this study must be aware of *why* Labour have refused to adopt the full IHRA antisemitism definition if they are

to believe it justified. Meanwhile, *Accessibility* supposedly increases every time an available consideration is used, thus making it more likely that the consideration is used in the future (ibid.). This is further linked to Chong & Druckman's "loudness hypothesis" which states that "repeated exposure to a frame… increases the accessibility of the frame" (p108). For example, a participant in this study who has read multiple news articles critical of Labour's handling of the antisemitism issue, is more likely to think that Labour have mishandled the antisemitism issue. *Applicability* is the relevance that a consideration has to the topic of the news source, and its appropriateness for forming an opinion about said issue (ibid.). For instance, a participant may believe that Labour would be more successful in government than the Conservatives yet will not use that belief to shape their opinion on whether Jeremy Corbyn has handled the antisemitism issue well. However, 'applicability' suggests that a news consumer must have the ability to not let their opinions be shaped by inappropriate or irrelevant thoughts. It does not entertain the thought that the previously mentioned (hypothetical) participant actually *might* let said consideration shape their opinion. It should be noted that other scholars have declared 'applicability' and 'accessibility' two competing schools of thought that define the process of framing (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2009), however Chong & Druckman's (2007) conclusion that both processes exist and can coexist too, is a more convincing explanation.

So, with the considerations of availability, accessibility, and applicability defined, it is clear that individual frames can influence framing effects, and so the extent to which a frame can trigger existing psychological schemas will influence the frame's effect (Rhee, 1997). However, there is slightly more confusion when it comes to deciding *how* existing beliefs and schemas might influence the effects – i.e. whether they will moderate the effects or strengthen them. The opinion of some scholars is that news frames become more powerful if they activate existing constructs (Shen, 2004). For instance, whilst invoking a study done by Druckman & Nelson (2003), Scheufele & Tewkesbury (2009) claim that "as a general rule of thumb, the more the receivers know about politics, the more effective are frames" (p26). This suggests that strong levels of political engagement will induce strong framing effects in an audience member. However, Chong & Druckman's (2007) piece insists that the opposite is true, that higher levels of political knowledge is more likely to moderate framing effects

because these people will have more available, accessible and applicable knowledge to judge the media source against. Other scholars have agreed with this conclusion (Boyle et al, 2006; Zaller, 1992), whilst also asserting that those with lower levels of political engagement are more likely to affected by framing. The position taken by the latter group of academics is the more convincing argument, as it follows that framing techniques will be less effective on those who already have higher levels of knowledge about the subject, and thus can call upon facts and other forms of reasoning that might counter a certain position taken by a news source. This study will further show this to be the case.

Like political knowledge, there are plenty of other audience-level factors that may influence the strength of framing effects. Some of these factors include past experiences, ongoing world events, inter-personal discussions, along with many more (Chong & Druckman, 2012). One potential moderating variable which has been tested in the past (and will be tested in this study) is political partisanship. Evidence collected by Slothuus & De Vrees (2010) suggests that strong party allegiances are likely to moderate framing effects because they will consume news sources that are critical/supportive of their party or disposition through the filter of their support for said party or disposition. More relevant to the overall aim of this study, however, is the idea that the importance of an issue to an individual will influence framing effects, with Lecheler et al (2009) believing it likely to moderate said effects. How important an issue is to someone can depend on many things that are a result of (as previously mentioned by Chong & Druckman (2012)) past experiences, ongoing world events, interpersonal discussions and something vaguely defined as 'personal identity' (ibid.). In this context, 'identity' is a rather imprecise concept, though it may very well be constructed through things which contribute to the building of someone's identity, such as gender, sexuality, culture and religion. There is little to no literature that has fully delved into this topic (with one notable exception)[7], nor is there any solid conclusion to be made bar Lecheler et al's (2009) regarding 'issue importance'. However, if someone were to play devil's advocate, they might contend that there is a logical argument that if an issue is really important to a consumer it will increase the strength of the

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[7]See Terkildsen & Schell (1997) on P.17

subsequent framing affects due to the emotions evoked by the news source. Therefore, this study aims to fill that gap in the literature by examining the concept of personal identity and how it affects thoughts and considerations on issues that are related (or unrelated) to that identity, thus discovering how identity impacts framing effects.

2. Methodology

The following methodology section first outlines the research design used for this study, detailing the construction of the frames, the questionnaire, and the method used for gathering participant data. The latter section of the first subchapter will point out some of the obstacles encountered in the data gathering process, as well as the limitations of the procedure that was eventually used. However, there will also be a section outlining the limitations which might affect the significance of the data, such as the topic chosen for this experiment.

2.1. Research Design

This study uses an experimental research design through an A/B random assignment test. This is the design used by most communication scholars attempting to measure framing effects, such as the ones previously mentioned in the theory section. The experimental design is often used because it is the best way to examine causal relationships (Knutsen & Moses, 2007). For a causal relationship to be examined there must be an independent and dependent variable – variables X and Y respectively. For framing experiments such as this, the frames often act as the independent variable, whilst the dependent variable is represented by the responses to questions about the participants' beliefs and attitudes (Lecheler & De Vrees, 2012). This allows for the participants' responses to be measured against the frame they were exposed to, also known as the 'stimuli', meaning that the dependent variable is affected by the independent variable. Finally, there are demographic/personal information questions that can be used as 'layered independent variables'. For instance, religion might be used so that we can see what impact this has on the responses to the frames, meaning that frames remain as the independent variable despite another independent variable being layered above it.

2.1.1. Constructing the Frames

The two separate frames, which for reference can be found in the appendices,[8] were named Frame 1 and Frame 2. These frames use the technique of 'emphasis framing', where certain aspects of the

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[8] See P.59 & 60

story are given greater emphasis. Frame 1 could also be referred to as the 'Left Frame' whilst Frame 2 is referred to as the 'Right Frame', to describe the positions the two frames take and make it easier to follow. As explained in the introduction, these two articles describe and argue in favour of opposite viewpoints on the issue of antisemitism in the Labour Party, particularly concerning the issue of the IHRA antisemitism definition. Each participant was exposed to one article, before answering a questionnaire, as followed by Nelson et al (1997) in their study. Both articles share similarities for the sake of consistency. Both have the exact same wordcount, the same number of paragraphs and images, the same format, with both articles being purposely short (one side of A4) so as not to put off respondents from participating.

However, certain aspects of the articles have been manipulated to provide two separate frames, including the title, subtitle, image and three of the five paragraphs of text. Using Robert Entman's (1993) description of media framing regarding 'selection and salience', certain aspects of the story have been made more salient depending on which side of the argument the frame represents. For instance, the Left Frame (Frame 1) has made Labour's reason for not incorporating the IHRA antisemitism definition highly salient for the purpose of justifying Labour's actions. On the other hand, the Right Frame (Frame 2) has made previous antisemitism scandals in the Labour Party highly salient so as to discredit the Labour Party. In terms of 'selection', the images chosen to represent each article are good examples of framing tools (Reese et al, 2001). Frame 1 contains an image of the Jewish Labour Movement to insinuate that Labour have the support of Jewish people, whilst Frame 2 contains an image of Jeremy Corbyn looked stressed in order to give the impression that he is guilty of misconduct. Furthermore, Entman's (1993) point regarding 'presence and exclusion' is important. For instance, Frame 1 excludes any sort of information which might incriminate Labour such as quotes made by leading figures, whilst Frame 2 shies away from any sort of debate over the actual issue - the refusal to adopt the IHRA definition.

2.1.2. Constructing the Questionnaire

After reading the article randomly assigned to them, the participants were then asked to answer a questionnaire.[9] As explained previously, the purpose of the questionnaire was to capture the opinions of the participants after being exposed to the frame, as well as to control for potential moderating factors. This is why the questionnaire is split into two distinct sections. The first section contains three questions, with the first being the most important in terms of capturing attitudes related to the story in question, and therefore the dependent variable. This question contains seven statements formatted as quotes for the participants to consider before marking the extent to which they agree with them. For instance, Statement A asks respondents to what extent they agree with the statement "Antisemitism is a substantial problem in the Labour Party," asking them to mark their answer down on a 1-5 Likert scale (with 1 meaning "strongly agree" and 5 meaning "strongly disagree"). All seven parts of the question follow the same format. The next two questions are related to political engagement and media consumption, with Question 3B asking participants to divulge which news sources they regularly consume. Whilst these two questions were included so that they might potentially be used as moderating variables (the layered independent variables previously mentioned), these questions were put in the first section as they were adjudged to be separate from the mainly-demographic questions that can be found in the second section. The second section asks participants to divulge their gender, sexuality, age, religion, religiosity, ethnic heritage and political affiliation. The questions regarding political engagement and media consumption seem less likely to appear in a census-style survey and were thus placed in the first section. Questions across both sections are either nominal or contain rank order scaling (Likert scale) whilst some provide comment boxes in case an answer to a question, such as Question 3B regarding media sources, does not appear in the answer boxes provided.

2.1.3. Gathering Data

Both the randomly-assigned article and accompanying questionnaire were combined with a front-sheet requesting the consent of the participants and ensuring their anonymity.[10] This constituted the

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[9] See P.61-67
[10] See P.58

research instrument which was used to collect data from respondents using a simple paper survey method. The Paper and Pencil format, where participants are given the research instrument to complete (Stopher, 2012), was considered the best method for collecting the data for a number of reasons. Firstly, this method involves less interaction between the surveyor and the participant, meaning there is less chance of conversational cues and leading questions influencing the participant, as might be the case with in-depth face-to-face interviews. Secondly, the format of the questions in the questionnaire, as well of the more private nature of a PAPI survey, make it easier for participants to reveal their attitudes. Conversely, the PAPI survey method was preferred to the online survey method because it allows for *more* face-to-face interaction. This is practical as it allows the surveyor to explain anything that the participant might not understand or be comfortable with, as well as be more convincing when assuring anonymity. Furthermore, the A/B testing tool available through online survey websites was often only available at great expense, making the PAPI method much more viable financially.

For the collection of data, a random sample of 100 was used, with the expectation that it would be large enough to yield rich results. The frames were assigned equally, meaning 50 respondents were exposed to Frame 1 and 50 exposed to Frame 2, as demonstrated by Table 1. Whilst surveys are sometimes expected to be done using convenience sampling (Fenton et al, 1998), meaning limiting the approach to family and friends, this was considered unviable if the range of demographics this study hoped to cover was to be found. Furthermore, using family and friends as participants seemed to make it less likely that anonymity of participants could be assured.

Table 1: Table showing distribution of frames within sample

	Frame 1	Frame 2
Frequency	50	50
Percentage (%)	50	50

For surveys that need to cover certain demographics or a wide range of demographics, it is common practice to make the sample selective, rather than random (Arcury & Quandt, 1999). This experiment

on identity falls under this category, as the sample needs to contain respondents who have personal connections to the news story so that their responses to the frames can be measured. Therefore, this sample needed a much high proportion of Jewish respondents (compared to the UK population average) and an above average proportion of Labour Party supporters. Considering the author was highly reluctant to use a targeted sampling method that might have come down to something similar to racial profiling on the street, a random sampling method was retained, whilst the *location* where the surveys were completed was specifically chosen. For the purpose of retaining a high proportion of Jewish people in the sample, the surveys were undertaken in the two constituencies of Finley & Golders Green and Hackney North & Stoke Newington. Finley & Golders Green was chosen due to it being the constituency with the largest Jewish population in the UK at 21% (Maddison, 2018), whilst Hackney North & Stoke Newington was selected for being the Labour constituency with the largest Jewish population (ibid.). As is demonstrated by Table 2, the sampling method worked, with 35% of the sample identifying their religion as Jewish.

Table 2: Table showing split in Religious Identity between frames

	Religion						
	Jewish	Church of England	Roman Catholic	Islam/Muslim	Sikh	No Religion	Total
Frame 1	17	8	2	5	1	17	50
Frame 2	18	4	4	3	1	20	50
Total	35	12	6	8	2	37	100

N=100   Valid Data=100%

2.2. Methodological Limitations

There are a number of limitations that need to be addressed, whether they be general limitations that affect all framing experiments, or limitations specific to this study. In terms of this study in particular, there are some potential limitations regarding the political issue chosen. The issue of antisemitism in itself is a deeply troublesome topic with lots of historical baggage, meaning it was important that neither the questionnaire or the articles contain any tropes or language that could be considered anti-Semitic, something believed to have been achieved. However, the story of antisemitism in the Labour

Party, a story that has been at the forefront of the UK news cycle for a good couple of years, is still very controversial. Being such a toxic topic, there was always the chance that participants may become offended by the frames, especially as they are supposed to convey a potentially controversial viewpoint on the issue. This ended up being the case, as one person refused to continue with the survey after reading Frame 2, whilst two refused to continue after reading Frame 1. It was felt that nothing could circumvent this risk, considering a controversial issue was chosen specifically so it might invoke a personal reaction in the participants.

A further limitation arises from the fact that this issue has been at the forefront of the news cycle. There was a chance that the salience of the topic would limit the chance of the framing effects because many have settled opinions on the issue. Indeed, this was found to be the case in Lecheler et al's (2009) study on issue importance. To circumvent this, a very particular part of the issue was chosen to focus on, that being the antisemitism definition, something that was a recent story when the surveys were undertaken. This is also unlikely to be a particularly high-profile story considering its complexity, unless a participant is someone with a high level of political knowledge, in which case framing effects are expected to be moderated.

Another limitation regards the nature of the articles themselves. The articles are written so as to feel like professional journalistic articles, yet because they were created for the purpose of this study, there is no information for the participant regarding the source. As has been proven, source credibility can act as a moderating effect (Druckman, 2001), with frames having almost no effect when promoted by a source known to not be credible (Hartman & Weber, 2009). The issue with this is that these articles do not have a credible source because the source is the study itself. Furthermore, whilst it is purposely not made clear to the participants that the experiment is a test of media framing, the lack of a source might make the participants suspicious. However, this method is less damaging to the richness of the results than being forthright with the participants regarding the nature of the experiment. Meanwhile, fabricating a story and then attributing it to a source might introduce unwanted moderating effects, as well as potentially being unethical.

The last limitations are relevant to all framing experiments of this kind, presenting the need to temper the certainty with which we can make solid conclusions on the basis of the results. Firstly, whilst framing effects are almost always "conceptualized as long-term in nature" (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2009, p29), the experimental models used to capture framing affects are often designed to examine short-term effects only. Whilst this is not a problem in itself, it does perhaps limit the extent to which we can make more overarching comments about society on the basis of the effects. However, the nature of the effects can still tell us a lot, particularly regarding the individual frame and the influence of personal identity and political partisanship on framing effects. The second limitation is more specific to the questionnaire method used in this study. Research has shown that answers to questionnaires can be rather inconsistent and show a lack of coherence (Zaller, 1992). This can be down participants showing a lack of interest in the story and not thinking properly about the issue, leading them to respond to questions seemingly randomly, and giving completely different answers to very similar (or even the same) questions. This cannot be controlled for of course, and whilst some of the questionnaires were filled out as such, there are still enough valid responses to elicit rich results, as can be seen in the next chapter.

3. Results

As noted in the introduction, this study intends to run four broad hypotheses about framing effects based on the theories put forth by communications scholars mentioned in the literature review. The following section will present the results of the experiment through tables which will either prove or disprove the hypotheses. The first hypothesis deals with framing effects in general, ignoring any moderating variables and looking at the raw difference in attitudes induced by Frames 1 and 2. Thus, the hypothesis states that participants exposed to Frame 1 are less likely to have a negative opinion about the Labour Party and its actions than those exposed to Frame 2. The second hypothesis looks at the moderating variable of political engagement, stating that those with high levels of political engagement are less likely to be influenced by the frames. The third hypothesis deals with the moderating effect of political partisanship, stating that those with political affiliations to the Labour Party and Conservative Party are less likely to be influenced by the frames than those with no affiliation to any party. The fourth hypothesis is concerned with religious identity, and its potential moderating influence on framing effects. Therefore, that hypothesis states that those who identify as Jewish are less likely to be influenced by the frames compared to those who are not Jewish.

3.1. Hypothesis 1: Participants exposed to Frame 1 are less likely to have a negative opinion about the Labour Party and its actions than those exposed to Frame 2.

Table 3: Table showing mean (average) attitudes towards Labour antisemitism news story

Attitudes towards Labour antisemitism story	Frame 1	Frame 2	Difference
A. Antisemitism is a substantial problem in the Labour Party.	2.72	2.10	0.62
B. The Labour Party are right not to incorporate the entire IHRA antisemitism definition.	2.92	3.88	0.94
C. Jeremy Corbyn and the Labour Party provide a threat to the Jewish Community.	3.64	3.34	0.3
D. Antisemitism is too often conflated with criticism of Israel.	2.84	3.00	0.16
E. Antisemitism is an issue that is more problematic on the left than on the right.	3.40	3.06	0.34
F. Antisemitism is an issue used cynically by the right-wing media to attack Jeremy Corbyn unfairly.	2.82	2.76	0.06
G. Jeremy Corbyn is an anti-Semite.	3.90	3.62	0.28

Note: Scales range from 1 (Strongly Agree) to 5 (Strongly Disagree)

Table 3 shows the results regarding the first hypothesis, using the mean of the respondents' attitudes as the dependent variable and the two frames as the independent variable. In terms of the answers given, 1 is equal to 'Strongly Agree', and 5 equal to 'Strongly Disagree' using a Likert scale, meaning that a lower mean average conveys a stronger agreement to the statement on aggregate, and vice-versa. However, the key to answering the first hypothesis lies in the 'difference' column of the table, which essentially shows the framing effect. As can be seen, the first two statements (A and B) show strong to medium framing effects, whilst the remaining five show weak or no framing effects. All of the statements have the direction of opinion between frames that was expected, apart from F which serves as an anomaly, although the framing effect is so small at 0.06 than we can write this off as inconsequential. However, the rest follow a logical pattern. For instance, the results for Statement A, which claims that "Antisemitism is a substantial problem in the Labour Party," show that participants of Frame 2 were more likely to agree to the statement, with a mean of 2.10. Meanwhile, those

exposed to Frame 1 leaned more towards disagreeing, with a mean of 2.72. This is expected, considering Frame 2 pushes the idea that antisemitism is a substantial issue in the Labour Party, whilst Frame 1 plays it down.

Whilst statements A and B show strong media effects, there is a question as to why, when the following five statements show little to no change in attitude depending on the frame. As previously mentioned, the larger difference between the means for Statement A is expected, as it is for Statement B also. Statement B suggests "The Labour Party are right not to incorporate the entire IHRA definition," showing a difference in mean of 0.94, the largest out of the seven statements. This is likely due to the fact that Frame 1 includes a relatively lengthy and rational explanation behind Labour's decision not to adopt the IHRA definition, whilst Frame 2 excludes any attempt to rationalise labour's actions. As a result, the mean of Frame 1's attitude ranking comes to 2.92, whilst those exposed to Frame 2 showed a mean attitude of 3.88. This shows the significance of Robert Entman's (1993) "presence and absence" theory (p54) when it comes to constructing frames that are likely to see framing effects. The absence of detailed reasoning behind a political decision, made it more likely that the audience would react negatively to the decision, and vice-versa.

Meanwhile, Statements C, E and G showed small framing effects, even though they also prove the hypothesis to some extent. This is because these were all statements critical of Labour (or in the case of E, critical of the left-wing in general), which found stronger agreement in those exposed to Frame 2. However, Statements D and F not only showed miniscule framing effects, to the point where we might say there was no effect at all, in the case of F, the expected result was actually reversed, as previously mentioned. In the case of Statement D, the answer perhaps lies in the complexity of the statement itself, which states "Antisemitism is too often conflated with criticism of Israel." This is an argument used by many on the 'left' who believe that accusations of antisemitism are used by Israel and Israel's defenders to shield the actions of the Jewish state (Boyd, 2018; Hasan, 2018). Or, less controversially, the concept of a 'Jewish state' itself can naturally lead to conflation, as the religion and the nation state are so closely linked (Almond, 2018). This is a complex and sensitive debate that it is perhaps difficult to have a firm opinion on after reading just one article, especially if that article is

not actually about that debate specifically. Furthermore, the statement can be read from two different angles, potentially leading to more confusion. Some may have read it to mean that criticism of Israel is wrongly attributed to antisemitism, the intended meaning. Meanwhile, some may have read it to mean that some on the left claim to merely be criticising Israel when instead they are being anti-Semitic. This especially may have been the case after reading Frame 2, which makes this point unambiguously. Therefore, the lack of any framing effects on this statement may be due to the nature of the statement itself rather than anything related to either the media frame or the individual frame. Thus, this can be put down to a methodological limitation, rather than a theoretical anomaly.

3.2. Hypothesis 2: Participants with high levels of political engagement are less likely to be influenced by the frames.

Table 4: Table showing average (mean) attitude toward Labour antisemitism news story by political engagement

Attitudes towards Labour antisemitism story	Frame 1		Frame 2		Difference	
	Engaged	Disengaged	Engaged	Disengaged	Engaged	Disengaged
A. Antisemitism is a substantial problem in the Labour Party.	2.23	3.45	2.06	2.16	0.17	1.29
B. The Labour Party are right not to incorporate the entire IHRA antisemitism definition.	3.40	2.20	4.03	3.63	0.63	1.43
C. Jeremy Corbyn and the Labour Party provide a threat to the Jewish Community.	3.53	3.80	3.35	3.32	0.18	0.48
D. Antisemitism is too often conflated with criticism of Israel.	2.90	2.75	2.97	3.05	0.07	0.3
E. Antisemitism is an issue that is more problematic on the left than on the right.	3.43	3.35	3.10	3.00	0.33	0.35
F. Antisemitism is an issue used cynically by the right-wing media to attack Jeremy Corbyn unfairly.	2.90	2.70	2.81	2.68	0.09	0.02
G. Jeremy Corbyn is an anti-Semite.	3.90	3.90	3.52	3.79	0.38	0.11

Note: Scales range from 1 (Strongly Agree) to 5 (Strongly Disagree)

The results behind Hypothesis 2 are illustrated by Table 4. Here we see the relationship between the mean of the respondents' attitudes and the frames, with 'political engagement' as a layered independent variable. As can be seen in the questionnaire,[11] the political engagement question is designed as a Likert scale, with the participant answering between 1 (strongly engaged) and 5 (strongly disengaged). However, to make the table simpler and the data more concise, the variables were transformed so that five became two, with those answering either 1 & 2, being considered 'Engaged', and those answering 3, 4 & 5 being considered 'Disengaged'. One of the methodological constraints to this question is the fact that this variable is self-identified rather than scientifically tested, potentially leading to participants' over-selling their political engagement in order to look more intelligent. However, the transformation of variables should circumvent this to an extent, by categorizing those who answered 3 as 'Disengaged'. In any case, there is nothing that the study can do if participants want to be slightly liberal with the truth.

Potential methodological hiccups aside, Table 4 shows some interesting results. Again, Statements A and B show the most revealing differences in attitudes, as it was with Table 4. The differences in means for those categorized as 'Engaged' came to 0.17 and 0.63 for Statements A & B respectively, showing much weaker framing effects than those categorized as 'Disengaged', with those means being 1.29 and 1.43, indicating strong framing effects. These two categories would then seem to prove Hypothesis 2 which states that political engagement acts as a moderating variable for framing effects. This hypothesis was formed around the arguments of communication scholars who believed that high levels of political knowledge are likely to reduce framing effects (Chong & Druckman, 2007; Zaller, 1992; Boyle et al, 2006). This is because those people are likely to have more pieces of information stored that are available, accessible, and applicable (Chong & Druckman, 2007).

However, as noted in the literature review, there is another side of the argument after a different study (Druckman & Nelson, 2003) seemed to show that strong levels of political knowledge produce strong framing effects. An evoker of this argument might point to Statement G which acts as a strange

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[11] See P.61-67

anomaly in this statistical analysis. Here, the statement, which reads "Jeremy Corbyn is an anti-Semite," seemed to produce stronger framing effects in the 'Engaged' category. Ignoring how small those effects are, something which admittedly reduces the amount of emphasis we can put on these results, it is interesting to note how this runs against the hypothesis. Statement G is an intentionally strong statement, to see whether a more controversial take might evoke more of a reaction in the respondents, depending on the frame. Perhaps the strength of the statement meant that only those with higher political knowledge felt confident enough to make such an accusation about Corbyn, and only after reading Frame 2, which contained many examples that might justify that position in the participants mind. However, it is important to recognize that the mean differences of only 0.38 and 0.11 means that the significance we can attach to this finding is severely limited, and the hypothesis should still be considered valid.

3.3. Hypothesis 3: Those with political affiliations to the Labour Party and Conservative Party are less likely to be influenced by the frames than those with no affiliation.

Table 5 shows the results relevant to Hypothesis 3, using the relationship between the mean attitudes of the respondents and the frames, with 'political affiliation' as the independent layered variable. As can be seen in the questionnaire, the question asking the participants which political party they are affiliated to offered them five choices. For the purpose of keeping the table workable, and for easier comparisons, the means of those who answered 'Liberal Democrat' and 'Other' were excluded from the analysis because the number of respondents who gave those answers was so minimal, as can be seen in Table 6.

This study expected to find strong evidence that political affiliation would act as a strong moderating variable for framing effects, as it states in the hypothesis. However, what can be seen in Table 5 is something much more complex but nonetheless intriguing. The mean attitudes for Statement A would corroborate the hypothesis, with the difference in the means between Frames 1 & 2 measuring 0.05 and 0.08 for those affiliated to the Labour Party and the Conservatives respectively, showing

effectively zero framing effects. On the other hand, the difference in means between Frames 1 & 2 for those with no political affiliation comes to a healthy 1.39, showing strong framing effects. Those affiliated to Labour showed averages that inclined to neither agree nor disagree with the statement "Antisemitism is a substantial problem in the Labour Party," no matter which frame they were exposed to. This is shown by those Labour supporters exposed to Frame 1 showing a mean attitude of 3.13, and those exposed to Frame 2, which is highly critical of Labour, showing a mean attitude of 3.08, only ever-so-slightly higher. As expected, the Conservatives tended to strongly agree with statement A, showing means of 1.25 and 1.33 for Frames 1 and 2 respectively. However, those with no affiliation showed means that varied heavily depending on the frame, with a mean of 3.39 for Frame 1, showing a tendency to neither agree nor disagree (but leaning towards disagreement), and 2.00, indicating agreement. This would suggest that Slothuus & De Vrees' (2010) assertion that party allegiances act as strong moderating effects is correct.

However, there are a number of results shown in Table 5 that actually fly against both Slothuus & De Vrees' findings *and* Hypothesis 3. Whilst the attitude means for Statements D & F show those affiliated to Labour or the Conservatives having stronger framing effects than those with no affiliation (Statement F showed mean differences of 0.42 for Labour, 0.41 for Conservatives, and 0.14 for 'No Affiliation'), the most intriguing results come from the results regarding Statement B. As can be seen, those affiliated to the Conservatives still showed minimal framing effects, with a mean difference of 0.08, whilst those with no affiliation showed a difference of 1.13 showing very strong framing effects, results that were expected. What was unexpected, however, is the very strong framing effects shown by those affiliated to the Labour Party, with a mean difference of 1.29. What we can see here then, is those in the Labour Party being more susceptible to the frames when it comes to Statement B than both those with no affiliation and those affiliated with the Conservatives. However, the more interesting comparison should be made between the framing effects shown by Labour for Statement A (0.05) and Statement B (1.29).

Table 5: Table showing average mean attitude toward Labour antisemitism news story by political affiliation

Attitudes towards Labour antisemitism story	Political Affiliation					
	Frame 1			Frame 2		
	Labour	Conservatives	No Affiliation	Labour	Conservatives	No Affiliation
A. Antisemitism is a substantial problem in the Labour Party.	3.13	1.25	3.39	3.08	1.33	2.00
B. The Labour Party are right not to incorporate the entire IHRA antisemitism definition.	2.25	4.25	2.67	3.54	4.33	3.80
C. Jeremy Corbyn and the Labour Party provide a threat to the Jewish Community.	4.31	2.92	3.56	4.23	2.67	3.56
D. Antisemitism is too often conflated with criticism of Israel.	2.38	3.17	3.00	2.15	3.75	3.15
E. Antisemitism is an issue that is more problematic on the left than on the right.	4.31	1.75	3.61	4.23	1.67	3.00
F. Antisemitism is an issue used cynically by the right-wing media to attack Jeremy Corbyn unfairly.	2.19	4.08	2.56	1.77	3.67	2.70
G. Jeremy Corbyn is an anti-Semite.	4.50	2.92	4.00	4.31	3.00	3.55

Note: Scales range from 1 (Strongly Agree) to 5 (Strongly Disagree)

Table 6: Table showing the split in political affiliation between frames

Frame	Political Affiliation				
	Labour Party	Conservative	Liberal Democrat	Other	Not Affiliated
Frame 1	16	12	2	2	18
Frame 2	13	12	4	1	20
Total	29	24	6	3	38

N=100   Valid Data=100%

One thing that was identified as a potential driving force behind these findings was the strength of the respondents' allegiance to the Labour Party. Table 7 shows the findings of that enquiry, where the variables for Question 13 were transformed so that those who answered 1 to 3 were categorized as 'Weakly Affiliated' whilst those who answered 4 or 5 were categorized as 'Strongly Affiliated'. Again, the results fly in the face of expectations considering the logic of the hypothesis. The differences in mean attitude for Statement B show that those with a strong affiliation to the Labour Party were more susceptible to the frames than those with weaker affiliations. Clearly then, the strong framing effects for those affiliated to Labour was not due to some participants displaying more tentative allegiances to the party, in fact quite the opposite.

Table 7: Table showing mean attitudes of those affiliated to the Labour Party by strength of affiliation

Attitudes towards Labour antisemitism story	Frame 1		Frame 2		Difference	
	Strongly Affiliated	Weakly Affiliated	Strongly Affiliated	Weakly Affiliated	Strongly Affiliated	Weakly Affiliated
A. Antisemitism is a substantial problem in the Labour Party.	3.13	3.13	3.20	3.00	0.07	0.13
B. The Labour Party are right not to incorporate the entire IHRA antisemitism definition.	2.38	2.13	4.00	2.80	1.62	0.67

Note: Scales range from 1 (Strongly Agree) to 5 (Strongly Disagree)

Therefore, the answer behind this interesting split clearly lies in the nature of the statement and its particular relevance to the Labour Party. Major political parties in contemporary democracies are not entities containing members with concurring viewpoints only. Instead, they are huge monoliths, often

unwieldly, containing members with many different viewpoints and of many different backgrounds. This is particularly true of both the Conservatives and the Labour Party. In the Labour Party in particular, there is a massive ongoing conflict between the left of the party, best characterized by the leadership and grassroots, and the more centrist side, a faction which most of the Parliamentary Labour Party belongs to (Behr, 2018). It then stands to reason that blind loyalty towards the decisions taken by the leadership does not necessarily exist, and that much of the criticism regarding Labour's antisemitism problem comes from within the party (Crerar & Marsh, 2018; Streeting, 2018). It follows that these statements would heavily split the party, as can be seen in Table 8 which shows the split in answers to Statement A for those 'Strongly Affiliated' to the Labour Party. The reason Statement B shows larger framing effects is perhaps because of the specificity of the issue at hand. Statement A, which states "Antisemitism is a substantial problem in the Labour Party," is probably a statement which a Labour Party member has often thought about, and therefore has more available, accessible and applicable considerations. Meanwhile, the story around the definition in particular was very recent at the time, meaning a potential absence of these considerations. This perhaps means that Labour members were more likely to be led by the frames. Nevertheless, this result calls doubt upon the hypothesis.

Table 8: Table showing percentage (%) of participants with 'Strong Affiliation' to the Labour Party by attitude to Statement A

	Attitude toward Statement A: "Antisemitism is a substantial problem in the Labour Party."					
Frame	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Total
Frame 1	25%	0%	37.5%	12.5%	25%	100%
Frame 2	12.5%	37.5%	12.5%	12.5%	25%	100%
Total	18.8%	18.8%	25%	12.5%	25%	100%

N=16   Valid data=100%

3.4. Hypothesis 4: Participants who identify as Jewish are less likely to be influenced by the frames than those who do not identify as Jewish.

Table 9 presents the results relevant to Hypothesis 4 which deals most heavily with the concept of 'identity', by using 'Religious Identity' as a layered independent variable. 'Religious Identity' is a category that combines Questions 8 and 9 in the questionnaire, meaning anyone who answered 'No Religion' for Question 8 but answered one of the specific religions in Question 9 (signifying they were brought up in that religion), was considered to have the 'Religious Identity' signified in Question 9. Seeing as this study is interested in the impact identity has on framing effects, the variables were transformed into two categories – 'Jewish' and 'Non-Jewish'. This is because the news story used for the frames is relevant to Jewish people and thus relevant to that aspect of their personal identity. On the other hand, those who answered 'Roman Catholic', despite having a clear religious identity, were simply grouped in as 'Non-Jewish' along with everyone else because the news story is not related to that aspect of their personal identity. The key to answering the hypothesis, and thus achieving the overall aim of this study, lies in comparing the framing effects for those whose identities are relevant to the fames, and those whose are not.

As illustrated by Table 9, 5 out of 7 statements show stronger framing effects for participants in the category 'Non-Jewish' when compared to those considered 'Jewish'. Again, Statements A & B show the strongest framing effects, along with the largest distinctions between the category with the potential moderating variable and the one without. The clearest example of this is the mean attitudes towards Statement A, where we can see that there is virtually zero difference between the average opinions in the 'Jewish' category depending on the frame, with means of 1.84 and 1.85 for Frames 1 and 2 respectively, indicating medium to strong agreement with the statement. In contrast, the table displays a large difference between the means of the 'Non-Jewish' category, coming to 0.99, indicating strong framing effects. The results for Statement A, as well as the difference in means for Statements B, C, and G, suggest the hypothesis to be correct, with the 'Jewish' category displaying zero-to-small framing effects, and the 'Non-Jewish' category exhibiting medium-to-large framing

effects. Meanwhile, Statements D and F show minimal framing effects regardless of the category, meaning we can dismiss the results as inconsequential.

However, there is one result which defies both the hypothesis and the premise of this study. As shown in Table 9, the responses to Statement E show a mean attitude difference of 0.63 for the 'Jewish' category and 0.15 for the 'Non-Jewish' category, suggesting that those identified as 'Jewish' showed stronger framing effects. This testing anomaly needs to be looked at in closer detail, considering it is the only result that would disprove the hypothesis. The answer again lies in the nature of the statement, which contends that "Antisemitism is an issue that is more problematic on the left than the right." In comparison to the other statements, Statement E (as well as D) is a much more general statement regarding antisemitism that does not specifically mention Jeremy Corbyn or the Labour Party, decrying the broader ideological concept of the 'left'. Statement D is similar in that it makes no direct assertion regarding Labour; however, this statement sees smaller framing effects in the 'Jewish' category (0.24), whilst Statement E sees larger effects. This is potentially because Statement D is one concerned primarily with religion, whilst Statement E is primarily political, therefore agreement/disagreement with the statement is more likely to run along political ideological lines than religious ones. Table 10 explores this potential explanation; however, the results remain inconclusive. The table shows that Jewish Labour supporters exhibited much stronger framing effects for Statement E than D, supporting the theory. However, Jewish Conservative affiliates showed the exact opposite. Therefore, whilst the explanation for this anomaly remains slightly unsatisfactory, it is perhaps the most workable at this moment of time.

Table 9: Table showing average mean attitude toward Labour antisemitism news story by religious identity

Attitudes towards Labour antisemitism story	Religious Identity					
	Frame 1		Frame 2		Difference	
	Jewish	Non-Jewish	Jewish	Non-Jewish	Jewish	Non-Jewish
A. Antisemitism is a substantial problem in the Labour Party.	1.84	3.26	1.85	2.27	0.01	0.99
B. The Labour Party are right not to incorporate the entire IHRA antisemitism definition.	3.84	2.35	4.10	3.73	0.26	1.38
C. Jeremy Corbyn and the Labour Party provide a threat to the Jewish Community.	3.03	3.93	3.26	3.27	0.23	0.66
D. Antisemitism is too often conflated with criticism of Israel.	3.11	2.68	3.35	2.77	0.24	0.09
E. Antisemitism is an issue that is more problematic on the left than on the right.	3.53	3.32	2.90	3.17	0.63	0.15
F. Antisemitism is an issue used cynically by the right-wing media to attack Jeremy Corbyn unfairly.	2.89	2.77	3.00	2.60	0.11	0.17
G. Jeremy Corbyn is an anti-Semite.	3.36	4.13	3.25	3.37	0.11	0.76

Note: Scales range from 1 (Strongly Agree) to 5 (Strongly Disagree)

Table 10: Table showing mean attitudes of Jewish participants by political affiliation

Attitudes towards Labour antisemitism story	Frame 1			Frame 2		
	Labour	Conservatives	Not Affiliated	Labour	Conservatives	Not Affiliated
D. Antisemitism is too often conflated with criticism of Israel.	2.43	3.50	4.00	2.43	4.00	3.60
E. Antisemitism is an issue that is more problematic on the left than on the right.	4.86	1.83	3.40	4.14	1.71	2.60

Note: Scales range from 1 (Strongly Agree) to 5 (Strongly Disagree)

4. Further Analysis and Discussion

Following the presentation of the results, this following chapter intends to conduct further analysis in the context of the communication theories set out in the literature review. Whilst the results section did offer some analysis of the results, these tended to be criticisms regarding the methodology and the statements used to capture the attitudes, or points about the Labour antisemitism issue and its context. Whilst there needs to be more analysis of the news story and the attitudes around it in order to contextualize some of the results, this section is more interested in how the results impact communication theory, and whether they either align with or contradict some of the assertions and findings of previous studies. The first subchapter intends to analyse each hypothesis set out in the results chapter, discussing whether the hypotheses were satisfactorily proven, and how the results fit within the context of current academic understanding. The second subchapter will be a more overarching discussion regarding framing theory in the context of this study's results.

4.1. Hypotheses Proven?

In the frame of the four hypotheses set out in this section, the results seemed to follow a familiar pattern. Statements A and B almost always seemed to prove the hypotheses to be correct (with the notable exception of Hypothesis 3), with the remaining statements fluctuating between following the logic of the hypotheses or not. However, Statements C-G often showed such small differences as to be almost inconsequential. However, each hypothesis displayed at least one anomaly that defied the hypothesis.

4.1.1. Hypothesis 1

The first hypothesis, which more-or-less hypothesized that there would be framing effects, needed at least some of the statements to show large framing effects that were consistent with the frames. Therefore, the results would suggest that the hypothesis is correct, even though only Statements A and B showed strong framing effects. However, the fact that strong framing effects have been found at all suggests that this study can be added to the many framing experiments that have shown strong media

effects. In terms of the debate around media effects discussed in the literature review,[12] these results prove the existence of strong media effects in controlled environments, along with similar studies (Nelson et al, 1997; Druckman, 2001; Sniderman & Theriault, 2004). However, the idea that strong short-term media effects can be shown in these studies is well established (Chong & Druckman, 2007; Scheufele & Tewkesbury, 2009), and will do little to change the reluctance shown by scholars to profess large-scale media effects (Livingstone, 1996). Furthermore, experiments such as this do not prove that media influence exists on the scale that the wider public believes it to (McQuail, 2005; Livingstone, 1996). Instead, all it proves is that people's attitudes can change depending on the particular pieces of information that are fed to them, something unlikely to surprise anyone either inside or outside the field of communications research.

4.1.2. Hypothesis 2

The second hypothesis, which asserts that political knowledge would likely serve as a moderating variable, was again proven correct by Statements A and B, with Statement G acting as an anomaly. This hypothesis was asserted with confidence thanks to the very persuasive logic of scholars such as Chong & Druckman (2007), who argued that those with high levels of political knowledge are more likely to have a higher number of stored considerations that they can test new information against. Thus, it stood to reason that someone with high political engagement would be well-informed regarding Labour's many separate incidents involving antisemitism simply from following political news. Thus, they would be less susceptible to Frame 1's assertions that Labour's antisemitism problem is overblown. This was heavily reflected in the results. Thus, the assertion made by Scheufele and Tewksbury (2009) that "the more receiver knows about politics, the more effective are frames", something they called a "general rule of thumb" (p26), seems to be patently untrue. Not only was this assertion made after a number of other studies showed otherwise (Boyle et al, 2006; Clawson & Waltenburg, 2003; Zaller, 1992), but it does not seem to follow logically at all, as will be discussed in the second subchapter.

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[12] See P.10-14

4.1.3. Hypothesis 3

The third hypothesis, which claimed that political affiliation would act as a moderating variable, was perhaps the only one which was heavily challenged by the results, with Statement B throwing a spanner in the works somewhat. It seemed logical that having a strong allegiance to a party would dampen one's tendency to be affected by a political frame that invokes a certain attitude or opinion regarding that party, or that party's rival. Indeed, this is a point made by Slothuus & De Vrees (2010). They proved that whilst frames are more likely to be effective when they are promoted by a party to which one belongs to, the opposite is true if a frame is critical of said party or promoted by a rival party. Thus, the difference in attitude between Frames 1 and 2 is likely to be small, since the two cancel each other out. This is what happened for the most part, however the strong framing effects attributed to Labour Party affiliates for Statement B was a notable anomaly. However, the potential explanation for this result laid out in the previous chapter,[13] which mainly highlighted how the statement and the fractured nature of the Labour Party might account for the anomaly, might be salient. Either way, that particular result raises the need to modify the hypothesis. The conclusion this study comes to is that, whilst party allegiance is likely to act as a moderating influence on framing effects, this is reliant on the party in question, the attitude being tested, and the relationship between the two.

4.1.4. Hypothesis 4

The fourth hypothesis stated that religious identity would act as a moderating variable. This was again proven to be true by Statements A and B, though Statement E acted as an anomaly. A working hypothesis was outlined for this anomaly[14] though it is fair to say it remains unsolved. However, there is enough evidence there to suggest that Hypothesis 4 has been proven to a satisfactory extent. Thus, we can say with confidence that religion can act as a moderating variable on framing effects, something which has not been covered by previous communications literature.

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[13] See P.36-37
[14] See P.39

4.2 Impact on Framing Theory

Whilst much of the theory discussed in the literature review is concerned with media effects, the findings in this study, proving that strong media effects can exist, does not add anything to the current academic understanding or debate around media effects. This is because, as is mentioned in the literature review, the common understanding of media effects refers to long-term effects, which means that the academic understanding does too (Livingstone, 1996; Bennett & Iyengar, 2008). In contrast, this study, and the many studies like it, proves only the existence of short-term media effects which, whilst powerful, are also fleeting (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2009). Therefore, there are severe limits to the significance of these findings when talking about larger societal problems, such as media power. Furthermore, as has been mentioned often throughout the text, this study is only another on a large pile of studies that prove the existence of framing effects. Whilst Hypothesis 1 was still important so that we could confirm that the frames did produce effects, it does not alter or challenge the current academic understanding.

However, the primary aim of this study was to find the significance of personal identity and political engagement and affiliation as potential moderating influences on framing effects. There have been studies that can be heavily linked to role of identity in framing effects, with the two main ones highlighted in this study being Terkildsen & Schnell (1997) and Lecheler et al (2009). The Terkildsen & Schnell study focused on a different aspect of identity, gender, whilst this study focused on religion. However, both studies arrive to the same conclusion when identity is examined as a whole. Terkildsen & Schnell found that conflicting frames concerned with women's rights issues produced effects amongst male participants and no effects upon female participants. Meanwhile, this study found that conflicting frames concerned with antisemitism, an issue primarily affecting Jewish people, found effects in participants who were not Jewish, and minimal effects in those who were Jewish. [15] The overall conclusion we can take from these two findings is that frames are less likely to be effective on people who have a direct relationship to the issue that is being framed. Furthermore, the

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[15] This is a fair summary of the results, although the specifics were of course more complex, as can be seen on P.40.

resolution of <u>Hypothesis 3</u> adds further steel to this finding, as having an affiliation to a political party gives you a previous consideration to news stories related to said party.

This finding is obviously then linked to Lecheler et al (2009) study, highlighting the moderating effects of 'issue importance' in framing. Their main takeaway was that the more important the story, the less effective frames relating to the story are. The reason for why this is the case can be summed up by Chong & Druckman's (2007) 'characteristics of considerations' and 'loudness hypothesis' theories, which observe that repeated exposure to a news story increases the accessibility of information related to the story. Therefore, because more important stories are more likely to dominate the news cycle, people are more likely to be exposed to the story. Subsequently, people are more likely to have available, accessible and applicable considerations related to the story, making them less susceptible to frames. However, this study reinforces a different point in the context of Lecheler et al's (2009) findings. 'Issue importance' is surely dependent on the person exposed to the frame regarding the issue. For instance, one person might think the issue of antisemitism in the Labour Party is unimportant, whilst another might think it is very important. What this study proves is that personal identity influences what individuals think is important, and thus influences which news stories they are more likely to be exposed to. Jewish people are more likely to think the news story used in this study is important compared to those who are not Jewish, simply because it is more important to *them*. Thus, we find much smaller framing effects for Jewish participants.

However, we should also ask how Chong & Druckman's (2007) theory on the characteristics of individuals' considerations tie into these findings. For the results regarding political engagement it is perfectly clear. Those who follow political news closely are obviously more likely to have available and accessible considerations about political issues, as evidenced by those considered politically engaged having smaller framing effects in this study. Furthermore, those politically affiliated to certain parties are likely to have considerations around party allegiance, as evidenced by the results. In terms of religious identity, and the considerations of Jewish participants that mean they are less susceptible to framing, you can perhaps wonder where these considerations come from. We can speculate that perhaps Jewish people are more likely to read news from Jewish publications or take

notice of stories concerning antisemitism. However, not every Jewish person will be politically engaged, so perhaps some considerations are simply natural considerations that make you more likely to agree with your 'side' no matter what, making it almost tribal. This is perhaps similar to Robert Entman's explanation of a 'cultural frame'. Nevertheless, this is a throwaway comment regarding psychology that the findings of this study cannot validate.

The last aspect of framing theory to comment on is the strain of thinking that the findings of this study actually contradict. Again, this goes back to Scheufele and Tewksbury's (2009) "general rule of thumb" (p26) comment. They mention that "the extent to which frames tap into existing beliefs and impressions will influence their effect" (p25), however the implication is that frames that successfully do this are more likely to be effective, which is contradictory to this study's findings. There can perhaps be a debate as to what "tap into" specifically means, however they mention a study performed by Shen (2004) suggesting that frames are stronger when they "activate existing constructs" (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2009, p25). The 'constructs' they refer to are most likely Chong & Druckman's (2007) considerations that people use when considering other information. However, what this study has proved is that these existing constructs make frames that push a contradictory viewpoint with these constructs less likely to be effective. Therefore, these existing constructs actually reduce framing effects.

Conclusion

Following the resolutions of the four hypotheses, it is fair to say that this study has confirmed the moderating influence of political engagement, political affiliation, and religious identity. Therefore, we can say with certainty that personal identity and personal politics influences the outcome of the framing process. This is an important finding in the wider context of framing theory, as there still remains doubt over the effect that existing schemas and constructs has on the effectiveness of frames (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2009). However, this study has highlighted the flaws in the arguments of scholars who hold those doubts, which is perhaps its main contribution to the academic field of communications.

Still, it cannot be denied that this study has found a number of results that are inconsistent with the main findings, which one could argue limits the amount of significance we can attribute to the findings. This is an understandable argument, however it could also be argued that peculiarities in the data were always likely due to the topic chosen for the news frames. Antisemitism in itself is an utterly abhorrent ideology, with such a long and sad history that news stories and issues surrounding it are often toxic and controversial. The story of antisemitism in the Labour Party is perhaps even more so, as it adds the further dimension of political partisanship. The increasing political polarization in the UK means that any ideological or political debate often descends into the realm of toxicity as well. Therefore, if another framing experiment wanted to test the moderating influence of religion and political affiliation at the same time, it would be advisable that a less controversial issue was used for the frames. This would potentially also help in the process of collecting data, as potential respondents will be more likely to participate or be friendly whilst participating. Apart from this slight issue, this study stands behind its methodological decisions, and believes the main results validate this position.

For further enquiry into theories and issues related to this study, the following works of literature are recommended. For a comprehensive guide on the practice and theory behind media framing please read Scheufele and Tewksbury's (2009) chapter in *Media Effects: Advances in theory and research*, third edition (Bryant & Oliver, 2009). For the work perhaps most referenced by studies related to

media framing, please read Robert Entman's article (1993) *Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm*. For works relating to the psychological processes behind media framing, please turn your attention to Chong & Druckman's (2007) article *Framing Theory*, and Fuyuan Shen's (2004) *Effects of news frames and schemas on individuals' issue interpretations and attitudes* (2004). For an experiment related to the influence of identity on framing, please refer to Terkildsen & Schnell's (1997) article *How media frames move public opinion: An analysis of the women's movement*. For the most influential framing experiment, serving as a blueprint for this study, please refer to Nelson, Clawson & Oxley's (1997) work *Media framing of a civil liberties conflict and its effects on tolerance.*

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MOST RECENT LABOUR ANTISEMITISM ROW BLOWN OUT OF PROPORTION

Why Labour haven't incorporated the full IHRA definition of antisemitism.

There has been outrage in Britain after the Labour Party's National Executive Committee (NEC) recently decided to change the widely accepted definition of antisemitism in their code of conduct. This has sparked much debate over Jeremy Corbyn's leadership and ability to deal with what he's called "pockets of antisemitism" in the Labour Party.

Labour's reasoning behind its decision not to incorporate the IRHA's working definition of antisemitism revolves around the leadership's belief that the definition diminishes the ability of its members to criticize Israel. However, people might still ask why this dispute over the definition is so important?

Despite the way it has been reported, this is not a case of the Labour Party inventing their own weaker definition of antisemitism. The NEC has adopted the core IHRA definition in full, with the changes instead regarding specific clauses denoting examples of antisemitism. The Labour Party has accepted seven out of the eleven examples provided by the IHRA, whilst adding further examples taken from the Home Affairs select committee.

The examples of antisemitism that have been refuted by the Labour Party, have been so because they involve the state of Israel and Israelis rather than Judaism and Jewish people as a whole. Some Jewish Labour voices believe this to be a tactic – conflating antisemitism with legitimate criticism of Israel. The Labour Party are specifically wary of accepting these examples, as it would make it more difficult to have a neutral relationship with Israel should they be elected to government.

Following Labour's decision regarding the definition change, the Labour MP Margaret Hodge confronted Jeremy Corbyn in the commons, reportedly calling him "an anti-Semite and a racist." This inflammatory and libellous rhetoric has done nothing to improve the tensions between the Jewish community and the outside world, and risks trivialising antisemitism for the purposes of political gain. The timing of the scandal has been noted by many Labour members, after the Conservatives shambolic progress in Brexit negotiations has led to Labour overtaking them in the polls.

CORBYN'S ANTISEMITISM NIGHTMARE RAGES ON

Labour add fuel to fire after refusing to accept the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance's standard definition of antisemitism.

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The Labour Party is now the only major political institution in the UK that refuses to accept the IHRA's working definition, an almost incomprehensible decision politically - never mind morally. The decision came after numerous scandals involving key figures being accused of antisemitism, including former London Mayor Ken Livingstone, Labour MP Naz Shah, and even Corbyn himself, whose 2012 comments supporting an obviously anti-Semitic mural were recently unearthed.

Many Labour Party members have been keen to point out that what is supposedly legitimate criticism of Israel has been conflated with anti-Semitism, including Chris Williamson MP who said, "criticizing Israel isn't the same as antisemitism." However, many on the Left, such as Owen Jones and Naomi Klein, also accept that clear antisemitism has been disguised as 'criticism of Israel', with former Labour candidate Vicky Kirby being a good example. She said that Israel were "the real oppressors" and that "Hitler now seems to be their teacher," calling him a Zionist god.

Following Labour's decision regarding the definition change, the long-standing respectable Labour MP Margaret Hodge confronted Jeremy Corbyn in the commons, reportedly calling him "an anti-Semite and a racist." Furthermore, three leading Jewish newspaper recently published front-pages that all read "United We Stand", naming Corbyn an "existential threat to Jewish life" in the UK. Undoubtedly, this sorry state-of-affairs shows just how far the once-revered anti-racism campaigner has fallen since becoming leader.

Appendix 6: Questionnaire
Antisemitism in the Labour Party – Questionnaire

Please make sure you have read the article preceding this questionnaire before answering the following questions.

1. To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

- **A) "Antisemitism is a substantial problem in the Labour Party."**

  Strongly agree   1   2   3   4   5   Strongly disagree

- **B) "The Labour Party are right not to incorporate the entire IHRA antisemitism definition."**

  Strongly agree   1   2   3   4   5   Strongly disagree

- **C) "Jeremy Corbyn and the Labour Party provide a threat to the Jewish community."**

  Strongly agree   1   2   3   4   5   Strongly disagree

- **D) "Antisemitism is too often conflated with criticism of Israel."**

  Strongly agree   1   2   3   4   5   Strongly disagree

- **E) "Antisemitism is an issue that is more problematic on the left than on the right."**

  Strongly agree   1   2   3   4   5   Strongly disagree

- **F) "Antisemitism is an issue used cynically by the right-wing media to attack Jeremy Corbyn unfairly."**

  Strongly agree   1   2   3   4   5   Strongly disagree

- **G) "Jeremy Corbyn is an anti-Semite."**

  Strongly agree   1   2   3   4   5   Strongly disagree

2. How politically engaged are you? (E.G Voting, following political news etc).

Strongly engaged   1   2   3   4   5   Strongly disengaged

3A. Would you agree that you get a balanced media diet? (E.G Sources that cover a range of political viewpoints)

Strongly agree   1   2   3   4   5   Strongly disagree

3B. Which of the following news sources would you say you <u>regularly</u> consume?

<u>Please tick all that apply</u>

The Sun		The Financial Times		Guido Fawkes	
The Independent		The Guardian		The Canary	
Daily Mail/Mail Online		Facebook		BBC News	
The Times		Twitter		Sky News	
The Telegraph		Reddit		Channel 4 News	
Daily Mirror		Buzzfeed		ITV News	
Daily Express		VICE		New Statesman	
The Spectator		The Observer		Breitbart	
The Daily Star		The Jewish Chronicle		LBC	
The Metro		The Morning Star		Other (Please specify below)	

Any other news sources not on the list can be written on the lines below.

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……….

This questionnaire is anonymous. However, it would be a great help to us if you could provide some basic information about yourself. Please answer the following questions by ticking the box(es) that apply to you:

4. What is your gender?

Male	
Female	
Other (please specify below)	

…………………………………………………………………………..

5. What is your sexuality?

Heterosexual/Straight	
Gay or lesbian	
Bisexual	
Other (please specify below)	
Do not wish to state	

…………………………………………………………………………..

6. Do you consider yourself a member of the lesbian, gay, bisexual and/or transgender community (LGBT)?

Yes	
No	
Prefer not to say	

7. What is your age?

18-24	
25-34	
35-44	
45-54	
55-64	
65+	
Do not wish to state	

8. Do you regard yourself as belonging to any particular religion?

Jewish		Sikh	
Church of England/Anglican		Buddhist	
Roman Catholic		Other non-Christian (please specify below)	
Church of Scotland/Presbyterian		No religion	
Other Christian (please specify below)		Other (please specify below)	
Islam/Muslim		Do not wish to state	

…………………………………………………………………………………..

9. In what religion, if any, were you brought up (family religion)?

Jewish		Sikh	
Church of England/Anglican		Buddhist	
Roman Catholic		Other non-Christian (please specify below)	
Church of Scotland/Presbyterian		No religion	
Other Christian (please specify below)		Other (please specify below)	
Islam/Muslim		Do not wish to state	

……………………………………………………………………………..

10. Apart from special occasions such as weddings, funerals and baptisms, how often nowadays do you attend services or meetings connected with your religion? (Do not answer if you picked "No religion" for both questions 8 and 9)

Once a week or more	
Less often but at least once in two weeks	
Less often but at least once a month	
Less often but at least twice a year	
Less often but at least once a year	
Less often than once a year	
Never or practically never	
Varies too much to say	

11. Which of the following best represents your racial or ethnic heritage?

White British/Irish/Other White Background (Please Specify Below)	
Mixed/Multiple Ethnic Background E.G. White & Black African/White & Asian	
Asian/Asian British E.G. Indian, Pakistani, Chinese	
Black British/African/Caribbean	
Arab/Arab British	
Other (please specify below)	
Do not wish to state	

………………………………………………………………………………..

12. Which of these political parties best describes your political affiliation?

Labour	
Conservative	
Liberal Democrat	
Other (please specify below)	
Not affiliated to any party	
Do not wish to state	

………………………………………………………………………………..

13. How strong is your affiliation to said party, with 1 meaning you have voted for them, and 5 meaning you are a fully-fledged member? (Do not answer if you answered "Not affiliated to any party" or "Do not wish to state" to Question 12)

Weakly affiliated   1   2   3   4   5   Strongly affiliated

END OF QUESTIONNAIRE